Representational Structure
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Lamina I spinothalamocortical inputs form a primary interoceptive representation in dorsal insula that is re-represented anteriorly.
"The Aδ- and C-type primary afferent fibres that are relayed by lamina I relate homeostatic information — that is, much more than simply ‘pain and temperature’ sensations — from all tissues."
The functional anatomy of lamina I, p. 657
This establishes that lamina I conveys structured, modality-specific interoceptive content that supports a dedicated representational subspace in insular cortex, clarifying how bodily state is encoded in the brain for conscious access and comparison with representational organization in AI systems .
Figures
Figure 3 (p. 660)
: The diagram summarizes a hierarchical, topographic interoceptive pathway culminating in anterior insula re-representations, aligning with representational structure necessary for conscious evaluation of bodily state .
Limitations: This is a synthesis of prior anatomical and imaging studies rather than a single new dataset; precise neural codes and timing within insula are not resolved.
Valence and Welfare
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Anterior insula–ACC–orbitofrontal circuits link interoceptive feelings to motivation and hedonic valuation.
"Finally, these findings signify the cortical representation of feelings from the body as the likely basis for human awareness of the physical self as a feeling entity. This association provides a fundamental framework for the involvement of these feelings with emotion, mood, motivation and consciousness."
Conclusions and future directions, p. 663
By tying interoceptive maps to emotion and motivation, the paper sketches neural substrates for valence and welfare relevant to suffering and well-being, paralleling how value and aversion signals are instantiated in AI agents .
Limitations: Claims integrate multiple imaging and clinical observations; causal specificity of each node (insula, ACC, OFC) for valence is inferred rather than isolated experimentally.
Self Model and Reportability
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Re-representations of interoceptive state in anterior insula support a meta-representational model distinguishing self from non-self.
"So, the representational image of the body’s state provides a neural basis for distinguishing self from non-self, and re-representations of this image enable the behavioural neural agent to project the effects of possible actions onto the state of the body, as well as the resultant changes in such feeling states due to interactions with other (external) agents."
Conclusions and future directions, p. 664
This links interoceptive re-representations to a self-model with predictive and reportable qualities, suggesting a route from bodily signals to conscious self-related judgments that can inform AI designs with explicit confidence/report pathways .
Limitations: Conceptual inference based on reviewed evidence; no direct behavioral report-manipulation experiment is presented to isolate the self-model mechanism.